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Abstract In a marketing channel governed by goodwill dynamics, players adjust their pric-
ing and advertising strategies when shifting from a wholesale price contract (WPC) to a rev-
enue sharing contract (RSC). We demonstrate that this shift is not payoff-Pareto-improving
when the retailer, who is the player transferring the share of revenues, is myopic. Further, we
identify the conditions under which the negative effects an RSC creates may be alleviated
when the manufacturer offers a support program. Finally, contrarily to operational coor-
dination instruments such as an RSC, a support program always leads to a payoff-Pareto-
improving situation and thus should be preferred by firms to reach coordination.
Keywords Marketing channel · Contracting · Revenue-sharing contract · Support
program · Stackelberg feedback strategies
1 Introduction
The seminal work by Cachon (2003) “Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts” has in-
troduced the concept of coordination in the supply chain management literature. SC coor-
dination refers to the implementation of a contract scheme that leads to a win-win situation
and turns out to be profit-improving. Pasternak (2002), for instance, has showed the ef-
fectiveness of a rebate contract in coordinating a channel, in the sense that all players get
some economic benefits under that contract regime. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) demon-
strate that coordination may be achieved through a revenue sharing contract in a simple SC
composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Cachon (2003) carefully reviewed the most
frequently used contract in SC coordination, highlighting strengths and weaknesses, as well
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as benefits and drawbacks. Broadly speaking, the adoption of a contract scheme has the pur-
pose of inducing players’ strategies through increasing the economic outcomes of the entire
channel rather than only maximizing their own payoff function (Pasternack 2002). SC co-
ordination, as introduced by Pasternack (2002) and Cachon (2003), consists of adopting a
contract scheme to reach a total channel profits as close as possible to the vertical integration
scenario, which thus represents an upper-bound benchmark.
The marketing literature, instead, is characterized by two different research streams. On
one hand, it associates the concept of coordination to vertical integration, which consists of
summing up the players’ value functions and optimizing with respect to only one objective
function. Jørgensen and Zaccour (2003a) model channel coordination scenario as vertical in-
tegration scenarios, where the channel members agree to make coordinated decisions acting
as one firm when determining its advertising and promotion strategies. On the other hand,
channel coordination has been associated with providing some incentives in order to modify
players’ strategies. For instance, a suitable coordinating device is profit sharing, whose idea
is to induce a relationship between total channel profits and individual profits such that if
anyone of these is maximized, they are all maximized (Jeuland and Shugan 1983; Moorthy
1988). Other mechanisms are directly linked to players’ strategies. Jørgensen et al. (2000)
suggest that a support program coordinates a channel when the manufacturer designs an
intertemporal retailer advertising support program that creates an incentive for the retailer
to choose her advertising efforts in the way that the manufacturer desires. Jørgensen and
Zaccour (2003a) build up an incentive by which the manufacturer conditions his advertis-
ing decision on the retailers’ current promotion. Jørgensen and Zaccour (2003b) show how
coordination can be achieved when all the channel members apply appropriate incentive
strategies and those strategies are credible. Jørgensen et al. (2006) show how a manufacturer
has to construct an incentive to lead a retailer to advertise at the same level of the vertical
integration scenario.
Contracting in SCM follows exactly this direction of the second stream of marketing re-
search. As Tsay et al. (1999) explain, contracts provide a means for bringing the total chain
profits to the vertical integration scenario profits, achieving coordination by identifying the
intra-chain dynamics that create inefficiencies, and modifying the structure of the relation-
ships to more closely align individual incentives with global optimization. Applications of
contracts are really successful in business practices: for instance, Blockbuster coordinated
its channel by means of a revenue-sharing contract (Dana and Spier 2001), IBM uses a lease
contract to control the reverse flows (Fleischmann et al. 2002), while Dillard’s Department
Stores, JCPenney, and Wal-Mart have adopted a rebate sales contract with VMI to reach
coordination (Wong et al. 2009). However, contracting is not always suitable for SC and
marketing channel coordination as its success may depend on several features.
Revenue sharing contract (RSC) is a coordination scheme that has attracted most of
the attention of research and practice. One of its main strengths is the mitigation of the
double marginalization effect when the demand depends on price because the whole-
sale and, consequently, retail price turns out to be lower than in a scenario without
an RSC. Due to this motivation, an RSC is also called a two-parameter contract. Re-
cent research in supply chain management has shown that an RSC works perfectly to
coordinate a one-supplier, one-retailer chain in applications on the video-rental indus-
try (Cachon and Lariviere 2005). Although research in game theory showed the bene-
fits of an RSC in various applications (e.g., Pan et al. 2010; Cachon and Lariviere 2005;
El Ouardighi et al. 2008; Geng and Mallik 2007; Dana and Spier 2001; Wang 2006;
Yao et al. 2008; El Ouardighi and Kim 2010), some limitations exist. For instance, an RSC
does not apply in industries in which transaction costs are really high (De Giovanni 2011b),
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when chain competition occurs (Cachon and Lariviere 2005), or when the implementation
of information and auditing systems is too complex. Adopting an RSC, Blockbuster pays
a wholesale price of $8 instead of $65 to its suppliers which get 30–45 % of the com-
pany’s revenues (Cachon and Lariviere 2005). However, by adopting an RSC, Blockbuster
has changed the way of managing the business into the video-rental sector. Yet, Antioco
competes adequately with Blockbuster only if it transfers 55 % of its revenues to its sup-
pliers, which results in a definitely inefficient deal for the company (Kadlec et al. 1998).
This paper contributes in this direction, identifying other negative aspects emerging from
the adoption of an RSC in a simple marketing channel while suggesting possible counter-
measures to be undertaken.
We characterize a differential game of marketing and compare players’ strategies and
payoffs of coordinated and non-coordinated scenarios, as carried out by means of an RSC
and a wholesale price contract (WPC), respectively. We confine our interest to a single-
manufacturer, single-retailer chain. Both players invest in advertising in order to build up
goodwill dynamics, the manufacturer controls the wholesale price while the retailer decides
the retail price. In a coordinated scenario, the retailer transfers part of the revenues to the
manufacturer to modify strategies. By contrasting strategies and payoffs in coordinated and
non-coordinated scenarios, this paper addresses the following research questions:
1. How are players’ strategies and payoffs influenced by adopting an RSC?
2. Is coordination by an RSC payoff-Pareto-improving?
3. What are the drawbacks an RSC implies in a channel?
In attempting to answering these research questions we faced some drawbacks of an RSC.
The most important depends on the relationship between revenues shared and contribution
to goodwill: when the player who transfers the share also contributes to the state, it turns
out to behave myopically, focusing on static rather than dynamic tools. This implies lower
profits for the entire chain. Thus, we identify the remedies to this drawback in the implemen-
tation of a support program. A well-established result is that support programs in marketing
channels may be Pareto-improving under specific conditions. For example, Jørgensen et
al. (2003) emphasized the benefits a manufacturer obtains when supporting a retailer’s ad-
vertising expenditures. Both Karray and Zaccour (2006) and Jørgensen et al. (2000, 2001)
demonstrated that a support program may exert some positive economic advantages. Ac-
cording to Jørgensen et al. (2003), when both advertising and promotion contribute to good-
will, a support program is beneficial only when the level of brand image is intermediate and
the negative effect of promotion is not too damaging. He et al. (2009) demonstrated that
offering a support program may depend on the players’ profit margins: A manufacturer is
willing to support the retailer’s advertising efforts only when the retailer’s margin is lower
than the manufacturer’s margin or close to it. De Giovanni (2011a) showed that a support
program is payoff-Pareto-improving only when a retailer contributes substantially to the
stock of goodwill and independently of the contribution of a manufacturer. We show that a
support program may alleviate the drawbacks due to the adoption of an RSC. Finally, this
paper provides four main contributions in the literature:
1. Contrary to the literature on contracting—and specifically on RSC and coordination—
that consists of static research (e.g., Cachon and Lariviere 2005) or dynamic research in
open loop strategy (e.g., El Ouardighi et al. 2008), we characterize a Markovian feed-
back strategy as real business and practice update their strategies in any instant of time;
therefore feedback solutions supply more valuable information than static or open loop
solution.
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2. This study is the first in evaluating the effectiveness of an RSC when the player who
transfers a share of revenues also does advertising to contribute to goodwill. Current
research introducing the goodwill dynamic and advertising model games, in which the
party who transfers part of its revenues no longer contributes also to the state (e.g., El
Ouardighi et al. 2008);
3. We make the assumption that the wholesale price is a decision variable rather than a
parameter. Research in static (e.g., Yao et al. 2008) and dynamic literature (e.g., El
Ouardighi and Kim 2010) has considered the wholesale price exogenously. The core
issue when adopting an RSC relates to how the player beneficiary of the share lowers
the wholesale price. Modelling the wholesale price as a control variable provides thus a
better understanding on how it decreases when an RSC is put in place.
4. While previous research used either marketing coordination mechanisms (e.g., support
programs) or operational coordination scheme (e.g., contracting), this research combines
the benefits of both instruments in achieving coordination.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the differential game model, while Sect. 3
characterizes the Stackelberg equilibria under non-coordinated and coordinated scenarios.
Section 4 compares both strategies and outcomes, also highlighting the limitations of an
RSC; thus, Sect. 5 characterizes a differential game in which an RSC is complemented with
a support program. Finally, Sect. 6 reports the concluding remarks.
2 The model
A channel is composed of one manufacturer, player M , and one retailer, player R. Players
focus on the use of marketing strategies to maximize their own payoffs. The manufacturer
decides the wholesale price, ω(t) as well as advertising efforts, AM(t); the retailer controls
both the retail price and the advertising efforts, expressed by p(t) and AR(t), respectively.
Each player’s advertising efforts contribute to goodwill. In order to capture the effects of
advertising in building goodwill, we used an extended version of Nerlove-Arrow’s (1962)
goodwill equation, which already has been used in marketing research (e.g., Jørgensen and
Zaccour 2003a, 2003b) and evolves according to the following dynamics equation:
G˙ = aAM(t) + bAR(t) − δG(t), G(0) = G0 ≥ 0, (1)
where δ ≥ 0 is the forgetting effect that explains the natural reduction of the stock of good-
will while a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0 are the marginal contributions of the retailer’s advertising efforts
to this stock. We call these parameters advertising effectiveness. When these parameters as-
sume small values, the advertising media exhibits a low effectiveness. The accumulation of
this stock represents a critical point for the channel, whose demand depends on goodwill




) = θ√G(t) − βp(t) (2)
where β ≥ 0 and θ ≥ 0 represent the effects of pricing and goodwill, respectively, on cur-
rent sales. In order to satisfy the positivity assumption on demand, we need to satisfy the




We initially characterize two scenarios. The first is modeled by assuming an absence of
coordination between players. The channel uses a WPC to manage each transaction, which
implies that the manufacturer sells some products to the retailer at a wholesale price while
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the retailer sells those products at a higher retailer price, causing the double marginaliza-
tion effect. Although the latter implies some inefficiencies and leads to lower demand, it
is frequently used in business practices because it is simple to administer and implement;
moreover, it needs simple auditing mechanisms to be put in place. In the second scenario,
we model coordination using an RSC. One player—the retailer in our model—transfers part
of its revenues to the other player in order to get a reduction in the wholesale price, thereby
lowering the double marginalization effect. Although its theoretical assumptions are quite
appealing, this contract has been demonstrated to be suitable for applications only in few
industries (e.g., video-rental industry Cachon and Lariviere 2005), while the administrative-
related burdens, the auditing techniques to be adopted, as well as the information systems
to be put in place represent the main barriers for its application in several industries (De
Giovanni 2011b).
Contrary to previous research in operations and marketing using an RSC and assum-
ing the wholesale price to be exogenous (e.g., Cachon and Lariviere 2005), we model
it as a control variable. This way of modeling the wholesale price is consistent with the
adoption of an RSC, where the player who gets a part of the other player’s revenues low-
ers the wholesale price. φ ∈ (0,1) is the sharing parameter, which represents the frac-
tion of the retailer’s revenues transferred to the manufacturer that is assumed to be ex-
ogenous. We purposely disregard the case with φ = 1, which never happens in real busi-
ness practice and leads to a vertical integration scenario. We assume that the retailer
transfers a fraction of his gross revenues; as a result, adequately defining the sharing
parameter becomes essential to succeed and achieve positive profits. When φ = 0, the
players adopt a WPC. In accordance with the literature of marketing and operations us-
ing an RSC (e.g., El Ouardighi et al. 2008; Cachon and Lariviere 2005; Cachon 2003;
Pan et al. 2010; Geng and Mallik 2007; Wang 2006; Yao et al. 2008; Dana and Spier 2001;
De Giovanni 2011b; El Ouardighi and Kim 2010) and the research adopting a sharing profit
mechanism (e.g., Chintagunta and Jain 1992; Jørgensen and Zaccour 2003a, 2003b; Jør-
gensen et al. 2003, 2006) we keep the assumption that the sharing parameter is exogenous;
considering it as a strategy leads to an over specification of the model, where all possible
elements are computed and thus the differences among scenarios vanishes. Moreover, the
manufacturer decides the participation rate, which represents the percentage of retailer’s ad-
vertising efforts that he wants to pay. The support strategy is represented by B(t), so when
no support program is offered B(t) = 0, while when the manufacturer implements this strat-
egy B(t) > 0. The choices of the contract scheme and the support program also influence









where i = M,R. Assuming an infinite time horizon and a positive discount rate ρ, the man-
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Using Eqs. (1), (4), and (5), we have defined a two-player differential game with five con-
trols, Ai(t) ≥ 0,ω(t) ≥ 0,p(t) ≥ 0, and B(t) ≥ 0, and one state variable, G(t) ≥ 0. From
now on, the time argument is omitted to avoid confusion.
3 Scenarios
We characterize and compare three equilibrium solutions and confine our interest to station-
ary strategies, that is, strategies which depend on the state only (i.e., not on time). Restrict-
ing one’s interest to stationary strategies is a standard working hypothesis in autonomous
dynamic optimization problems with infinite time horizon. Strategies are evaluated at the
steady-state; they are current-state-dependent as well as time-independent.
Benchmark (non-coordinated) scenario Each player decides his strategies to maximize
his own payoff independently of the other player’s strategies. The retailer does not share his
revenues with the manufacturer, thus, φ = 0, while the manufacturer does not support the
retailer’s advertising efforts, thus B = 0. This scenario is played in a feedback Stackelberg
game in which the manufacturer is the leader. We use the subscript “N” to signify a “non-
coordinated scenario.”
Coordinated scenario The retailer transfers a fraction of her revenues to the manufacturer
to obtain a reduction of the wholesale price, thereby alleviating the double marginaliza-
tion effect. The new manufacturer’s strategies are computed also considering the sharing
parameter, φ ∈ (0,1). Even though, the manufacturer does not participate in the retailer’s
advertising efforts, therefore B = 0. Players adjust their pricing and advertising strategies
according to this combination of contract and support program, and we sought a feedback
Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer is the leader. We use the subscript “C” to sig-
nify the implementation of a “coordinated” scenario.
Dual coordination mechanisms scenario An RSC is complemented with a support pro-
gram, therefore φ ∈ (0,1) and B ∈ (0,1). The retailer transfers a percentage of her revenues
to the manufacturer while the manufacturer supports the retailer’s advertising investments.
We exclude the case when B = 1 because it will lead to a vertical integrated scenario (see
note 1). Also in this case, we look for a feedback Stackelberg game in which the man-
ufacturer is the leader. We use the subscript “D” for referring to the “dual coordination
mechanisms” scenario.
Note that we disregard the case in which a WPC is complemented with a coop program
since the results are aligned with the existing literature (e.g., Jørgensen et al. 2001). More-
over, we conjecture linear value functions for each scenario knowing that:
1. Long term strategies are also influenced by the “dynamic” parameters a, b, δ (goodwill
dynamics) and ρ (discount rate) (e.g., Jørgensen et al. 2000), which never appear in static
formulations;
2. Advertising strategies imply a carry over effect that can be captured only when introduc-
ing a stock variable representing brand goodwill (e.g., Eq. (1)) (see e.g., Chintagunta and
Jain 1992; Jørgensen and Zaccour 2005); and
3. Modeling the carry over effect of advertising by the goodwill dynamics even when con-
jecturing linear value functions is actually common in differential games research in or-
der to derive explicit solutions (e.g., Jørgensen et al. 2000; Jørgensen and Zaccour 2003a,
2003b).
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4 Equilibria
We derive the equilibria in the coordinated and benchmark scenarios in the following subsec-
tions and further comparing strategies and outcomes. This comparison allows for identifying
the limitations of an RSC under our model assumptions.
4.1 Equilibria in a non-coordinated scenario
Under a WPC scenario, each player aims to maximize his own payoff independently of the
other player’s strategies. Both players seek to contribute to building up goodwill, which en-
hances the demand and positively influences both players’ payoffs. On the other hand, the
demand negatively depends on price; thus, both pricing and advertising play a key role for
both players. Although a WPC still involves the problem of the double marginalization ef-
fect, it is the simplest contract scheme to be adopted in business practice. It is intuitive and
based on simple price transaction; it requires neither specific auditing systems nor particular
information systems to be put in place, while the administrative burdens the players face
are marginal. Most research in marketing uses this contract to manage transactions among
players, while only recently has research in contracting proposed alternative and more so-
phisticated contracts (e.g., Cachon 2003) that seem to be contest-specific rather than gener-
alizable. In this sense, channels and supply chains obtain successful economic benefits even
when using a WPC, although it presents several inefficiencies (e.g., the double marginal-
ization effect). All players throughout the channel add a markup, causing the final price to
be higher and the final demand to be lower than would be the case if firms were vertically
integrated (Tirole 1988). Nonetheless, it is quite diffused in managing players’ transactions.
We characterize the equilibrium strategies in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium wholesale price, retail price, and advertising strategies in a













8β(ρ + δ) , (8)
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bθ2
16β(ρ + δ) (9)
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2ρ
(11)
Proof See Appendix. 
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≥ 0. This result is in line with Taboubi and Zaccour
(2002), who demonstrated a positive relationship between pricing strategies and goodwill. In
contrast, advertising strategies are constant (i.e., state-independent). This result depends on
the missing interfaces between goodwill and advertising efforts in (4) and (5). Nonetheless,










16β(ρ + δ) ≥ 0 (13)
Such evidence motivates managers and practitioners to build up their stock of goodwill as
high as possible and then to price more. Although advertising is state independent, (12) and
(13) suggest that increasing the value of the state will benefit both players. By substituting
(8) and (9) into (1), we derive goodwill at the steady-state as follows:
GN∞ =
(2a2 + b2)θ2
16δβ(ρ + δ) ≥ 0 (14)
At the steady state, goodwill depends positively (negatively) on the customers’ goodwill
(price) sensitivity, while the large forgetting effect and discount factor values lower that
stock. Notice that the contribution of the manufacturer’s advertising strategy on goodwill
at the steady state is twice as large as the retailer’s. This result depends on the information
structure of the game.
4.2 Equilibria in a coordinated scenario
The channel may reach coordination through the adoption of a RSC, in the sense that it is
payoff-Pareto-improving. The operations literature has extensively highlighted the advan-
tages that a RSC creates, which are mainly related to the mitigation of the double marginal-
ization effect. Even though, we show here the implied limitations when the player who
transfers the share does also advertising. As we have previously introduced, the sharing pa-
rameter is assumed to be exogenous to avoid an over specification of the model. Moreover,
the structure of the game does not allow for considering the sharing parameter as a control
variable. Since the retailer is the follower, when computing the sharing parameter it turns
out to be null. Since the retailer influences the demand by controlling the price, she already
decides an optimal price which is independent of the sharing parameter value. We follow the
assumption of previous research in marketing and operations (e.g., El Ouardighi et al. 2008;
Cachon and Lariviere 2005; Cachon 2003; Pan et al. 2010; Geng and Mallik 2007; Wang
2006; Yao et al. 2008; Dana and Spier 2001; De Giovanni 2011b; El Ouardighi and Kim
2010) as well as the contributions using a sharing profits mechanism (e.g., Chintagunta and
Jain 1992; Jørgensen and Zaccour 2003a, 2003b; Jørgensen et al. 2003, 2006) thus consid-
ering the sharing parameter as exogenous while identifying under which values it allows a
two-parameter contract to be payoff-Pareto-improving.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium wholesale price, retail price, and advertising strategies in a




β(2 − φ) , (15)




2β(2 − φ) , (16)
ACM =
aθ2
4β(2 − φ)(ρ + δ) , (17)
ACR =
bθ2(1 − φ)
4β(2 − φ)2(ρ + δ) (18)
and the value functions assume the following forms:
V CM =
θ2









4β(2 − φ)2(ρ + δ)G
C + ς
C
1 (2a2ϕC1 + b2ςC1 )
2ρ
(20)
Proof See Appendix. 
Changes in strategies and value functions with respect to the state follow the same line
of the previous findings in a non-coordinated scenario. Although the wholesale price and
retail pricing strategies increase the goodwill, advertising strategies are state-independent
in the coordinated setting as well. Moreover, both value functions increase in the state; as
such, both players decide their strategies in order to build up a large stock of goodwill and
obtain a higher payoff. The goodwill at the steady state is derived by substituting (17) and
(18) into (1), thereby resulting in the following:
GC∞ =
θ2[a2(2 − φ) + b2(1 − φ)]
4βδ(2 − φ)2(ρ + δ) (21)
The sharing parameter, φ, influences the choice of implementing a RSC in a marketing
channel. Both pricing and advertising strategies are consequently influenced either positively
or negatively, which in turns leads to higher or lower goodwill and value functions depending
on the amplitude of the model parameter values.






GC(3 − 4φ + φ2)



















4β(2 − φ)3(ρ + δ) ≤ 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,1)
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As expected, results (1) and (2) highlight that both the wholesale price and the re-
tail price in a RSC decrease in the sharing parameter. This result is in the spirit of co-
ordination by a RSC, which allows for a reduction in the double marginalization effect
and an increase in sales as the demand depends on pricing (Cachon and Lariviere 2005;
De Giovanni 2011b). Finally, independently of the information structure, a RSC always
remains effective for reducing the double marginalization effect. Previous research has pro-
vided evidence on the effectiveness of a RSC when playing the Nash game, while we show
that playing the Stalkerberg game will not corroborate its usefulness. The result in (3) sup-
plies information on the manufacturer’s willingness to do more when implementing a RSC.
He increases advertising according to the sharing parameter, thereby providing further con-
tributions to enhance the stock of goodwill. This also represents a way to push the retailer to
share more, which increases advantages in terms of pricing and goodwill. The manufacturer
advertises more because the share represents an economic incentive to put additional efforts
into advertising. The result in (4) highlights the lower advertising efforts the retailer spends
when adopting a RSC. He possesses a lower amount of economic resources while expecting
the manufacturer to advertise more when receiving his share of the revenues.
The results of this corollary highlight the need to investigate the stock of goodwill at the
steady state when adopting a RSC. The different changes in players’ advertising strategies
may lead to a lower level of goodwill when the contribution of the retailer’s advertising
to that stock is considerably high. Any increment of the sharing parameter increases the
goodwill at the steady state when a > b. The derivative ∂G
C∞
∂φ
= θ2[a2(2−φ)−b2φ]4βδ(2−φ)3(ρ+δ) turns out to
be positive (negative) when the term in the square brackets is positive (negative). Conse-







implementing a RSC contributes positively to goodwill at the steady state only when





Therefore, implementing a RSC does not necessarily lead to higher goodwill at the steady
state. Consequently, the adoption of this contract positively influences the static tools influ-
encing the demand (e.g., price) but may negatively impact the dynamic tools (e.g., goodwill).
What remains to be verified is under which conditions a RSC should be avoided because it
sponsors static tools while diminishing the importance of dynamic elements. Therefore, in
the next section, we compare the strategies, state, and players’ payoff changes when moving
from a non-coordinated to a coordinated marketing channel.
4.3 Comparison of equilibria
This section introduces the difference in strategies, state variable, and players’ payoffs when
shifting from a non-coordinated to a coordinated setting. Although Cachon and Lariviere
(2005) as well as El Ouardighi et al. (2008) have shown the advantages of implementing
a RSC, we highlight the drawbacks it generates in a marketing channel since the manufac-
turer’s and retailer’s advertising strategies are not aligned.
Proposition 3 The manufacturer advertises more under a coordinated scenario with a RSC
since it results that ACM − ANM > 0,∀φ > 0.
Proof Computing the difference ACM − ANM , we get ACM − ANM = aθ
2φ
8β(δ+ρ)(2−φ) ≥ 0. 
As the manufacturer receives a share from the retailer—which could be assimilated into
an economic incentive to engage in more coordination—he advertises more for any positive
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value of the sharing parameter. When adopting a RSC, the manufacturer has two motivations
to contribute to the state: the first derives from the increasing demand and the second comes
from the retailer’s share.
Proposition 4 The retailer advertises less under a coordinated scenario with a RSC since
it results that ACR − ANR < 0, ∀φ > 0.
Proof Computing the difference ACR − ANR , we get ACR − ANR = − bθ
2φ2
16β(δ+ρ)(2−φ)2 ≤ 0. 
When implementing a RSC, the retailer transfers his economic resources to the manu-
facturer with the purpose of inducing him to advertise more. With this reduction, the retailer
contributes only marginally to the state, so that a RSC does not guarantee higher good-
will than a one-sided payment contract. The retailer has, in fact, few economic resources
to devote to building up the goodwill, yet he expects the manufacturer to advertise more
as a result of receiving additional economic benefits through the share. The goodwill at the
steady-state turns out to be higher under coordination with a RSC when a > b.












is the threshold that determines whether implementing a RSC leads to a higher goodwill at
the steady-state. That stock depends not only on the contract scheme adopted, but also on
the different media advertising effectiveness. When a WPC is adopted, both players adver-
tise to increase goodwill. When a RSC is implemented, the value of the state over infinity
varies according to the marginal contributions of both advertising strategies. Consider for
instance the special case when a is really small, which simply implies that the manufacturer
has chosen a lightly effective advertising media, the adoption of a RSC destroys the value of
goodwill at the steady state because the contribution of the retailer is simply more important,
while his advertising efforts are lower under coordination. This is a drawback of coordina-
tion through a RSC, which lowers the importance of goodwill and then the relevance of dy-
namic tools when the player who transfers the share of revenues also contributes to goodwill
through advertising. In fact, under coordination, the retailer focuses on the nominal benefits
a RSC provides (i.e., the reduction of the double marginalization effect). As a result, both
the wholesale and the retail prices are lower under a coordinated scenario, indicating that a
RSC promotes more static than dynamic tools. In this sense, the retailer becomes myopic
when a RSC is put in place.
Proposition 5 The manufacturer fixes a higher wholesale price under a RSC when the stock
accumulated under coordination is sufficiently larger than the goodwill accumulated under
non-coordination.
Proof The sign of the difference ωC − ωN = θ[2
√
GC(1−φ)2−√GN(2−φ)]
2β(2−φ) depends on the differ-






2,ωC > ωN . 
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The RSC mitigates the double marginalization effect only when the manufacturer’s ad-
vertising strategy effectiveness is higher than the retailer’s. In fact, in this case, the lower
advertising the retailer invests no longer lowers the level of the state as well; thus, coordina-
tion through a RSC exerts the purpose of reducing the wholesale price in each transaction.
In contrast, the stock of goodwill at the steady-state turns out to be very small because the
manufacturer’s advertising effectiveness is lower than the retailer’s.
Proposition 6 The manufacturer fixes a higher retailer price under a RSC when the stock
accumulated under coordination is sufficiently larger than the goodwill accumulated under
non-coordination.
Proof The sign of the difference pC −pN = θ[2
√
GC(3−2φ)−3√GN(2−φ)]
4β(2−φ) depends on the differ-
ence between the goodwill accumulated under coordinated and non-coordinated scenarios.







Ultimately, a RSC implemented to coordinate a marketing channel no longer exerts its
benefits of reducing the double marginalization effect and, consequently, increasing de-
mand when the stock of goodwill under coordination is not sufficiently larger that the
non-coordinated ones. Since the retailer advertises less under a RSC, coordination by a
two-parameter contract destroys the economic value when the manufacturer’s advertising
effectiveness is lower than the retailer’s. By substituting the steady-state values of good-
will into the value functions and comparing the players’ payoffs under the coordinated and
non-coordinated scenarios we formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The sign of the difference
V CM − V NM =
θ4φ[a2(δ + 2ρ)(8 − 6φ + φ2) − b2(δ + ρ)(6φ − 4 − φ2)]
128β2δρ(δ + ρ)(2 − φ)3
turns out to be as follows:
(a) When goodwill does not depend on the manufacturer’s advertising strategy, V CM − V NM≥ 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,3 − √5)
(b) When goodwill does not depend on the retailer’s advertising strategy, V CM − V NM≥ 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,1)
(c) When goodwill depends on both players’ advertising strategies, V CM − V NM ≥ 0 ∀φ ∈
(0,3 − √5) and ∀φ ∈ (3 − √5,1) ⇔ a > b.
Proof In Case (a), when a is sufficiently small, the polynomial (4−6φ+φ2) gives solutions
φ = 3 ± √5, thus that difference remains positive when φ ∈ (0,3 − √5). In case (b), when
b is sufficiently small, the roots of the polynomial (8 − 6φ +φ2) are both larger than 1; thus
that difference is positive for any value of φ ∈ (0,1). In Case (c), that difference is positive
either for any value of φ ∈ (0,3 −√5) or for any value of φ ∈ (3 −√5,1) whenever a > b,




(δ+ρ)(6φ−4−φ2) ; finally, when φ = 3 −
√
5,V CM = V NM . 
Proposition 8 The sign of the difference
V CR − V NR =
θ4φ[4a2(δ + ρ)(8 − 16φ + 8φ2 − φ3) − b2(δ + 2ρ)(8 − 8φ + φ2)]
512β2δρ(δ + ρ)(2 − φ)4
turns out to be as follows:
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(a) When goodwill does not depend on the manufacturer’s advertising strategy, V CR − V NR
< 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,1);
(b) When goodwill does not depend on the retailer’s advertising strategy, V CR − V NR
> 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,3 − √5);
(c) When goodwill depends on both players’ advertising strategies, V CR − V NR
> 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,3 − √5) ⇔ a > b.
Proof In Case (a), when a is sufficiently small, the polynomial 8−8φ +φ2 > 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,1),
thus V CR − V NR < 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,1); in Case (b), when b is sufficiently small, the polynomial
8−16φ +8φ2 −φ3 > 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,3−√5), thus V CR −V NR > 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,3−
√
5); in Case (3),
V CR − V NR > 0 ∀φ ∈
(






(δ + 2ρ)(8 − 8φ + φ2)
(δ + ρ)(8 − 16φ + 8φ2 − φ3) .
Finally, whenever φ = 3 − √5,V CR = V NR . 
In order for a RSC to be payoff-Pareto-improving, the manufacturer’s advertising
medium effectiveness must be higher than the retailer’s one, while the sharing parameter
should not be too high [e.g., φ ∈ (0,3 − √5)]. The manufacturer prefers the adoption of a
RSC when the sharing parameter is high and the retailer’s advertising effectiveness is low,
while the retailer prefers the adoption of a RSC when the sharing parameter and the retailer’s
advertising effectiveness are both sufficiently low.
Corollary 2 When the players use the same advertising media (a = b) it results that V CM −
V NM > 0, ∀φ(0,1) and V CR − V NR > 0, ∀φ(0,0.6377). Thus, the implementation of a RSC
makes the manufacturer always better off, while the retailer’s economic advantages depend
on the sharing parameter values: when it is sufficiently low, the adoption of a RSC also suits
the retailer.
5 Overcoming the drawbacks of a RSC through a support program
In this section we characterize a special case of the game to provide additional insights on
how to overcome the drawbacks of a RSC under the model assumptions. The retailer’s “my-
opia” induced when adopting a RSC could be lessened when the manufacturer offers a sup-
port program. As it has been already shown in marketing channel literature (e.g., Jørgensen
and Zaccour 2003a, 2003b) as well as in operations management (De Giovanni 2011a), a
support program is generally payoff-Pareto-improving because it implies players to invest
more (e.g., in advertising in order to increase the goodwill). By offering a support program,
a manufacturer promotes the importance of dynamic tools at the eyes of a retailer, who fo-
cuses instead more on static elements under a RSC contract. The support program assumes
the form of a participation rate, so that the manufacturer—acting as the leader—announces
he will adopt support programs for advertising strategies, the retailer decides her advertising
efforts, and then the manufacturer decides his participation rate. According to this sequence
of events, the next proposition characterizes the equilibrium strategies under this scenario.
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Proposition 9 The equilibrium wholesale price, retailer price, advertising efforts, as well as









2β(2 − φ) , (24)
ADM =
aθ2
8β(2 − φ)(ρ + δ) , (25)
ADR =
b(5 − 3φ)θ2
8β(2 − φ)2(ρ + δ) , (26)
B = 3 − φ
5 − 3φ (27)
while the value functions turn out to be:
V DM =
θ2
4β(2 − φ)(ρ + δ)G
D + b





4β(2 − φ)2(ρ + δ)G
D + ς
D
1 (4a2ϕD1 + b2(2ϕD1 + ςD1 ))
4ρ
(29)
Proof See Appendix. 
As in the previous two scenarios, wholesale and retail pricing strategies depend on the
state while advertising strategies are state-independent. Those strategies vary according
to the sharing parameter as reported in Corollary 1. The participation strategy is state-
independent and varies exclusively according to the sharing parameter.1 As the support
strategy increases in the sharing parameter (e.g., ∂B
∂φ
= 4
(5−3φ)2 > 0), the manufacturer is
willing to support when a RSC is implemented because he wishes to align the retailer’ focus
on dynamic tools. While the retailer becomes myopic under a RSC regime, a participation
strategy for supporting her advertising efforts shifts her focus on dynamic tools. This result
is clearly displayed in the next proposition.
Proposition 10 The retailer advertises more under a RSC with a support program than in
the benchmark and coordination case, since it results that ADR − ANR > 0 and ADR − ACR >
0 ∀φ ∈ (0,1).
Proof Computing the difference ADR − ANR , we get that: ADR − ANR = bθ
2(6−2φ−φ2)
16β(δ+ρ)(2−φ)2 > 0
∀φ ∈ (0,1). Similarly, computing the difference ADR − ACR , we get that: ADR − ACR =
bθ2(3−φ)
8β(δ+ρ)(2−φ)2 > 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,1). 
1Since the support strategy only depends on the sharing parameter, a full support (B = 1) is possible only
when φ = 1, which finally leads to a centralized scenario. The latter is out of our interest because results in
centralized scenario when all players contribute to goodwill already appeared in the literature (e.g., Jørgensen
and Zaccour 2003a).
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Offering a support program leads to higher retailer’s advertising efforts independently
of the sharing parameter values. When φ > 0, the retailer efforts under a RSC with a sup-
port program are higher than the benchmark case. On the other hand, the manufacturer
always advertises at the same level, independently of the participation rate with respect to
the coordinated case; therefore, ADM = ACM > ANM . This result is in line with the literature
of marketing and operations, which highlights the characteristics of a support program that
induces players to do more.
Proposition 11 Goodwill stocks at the steady-state compare as follows: GD > GC and
GD > GN .
Proof Simply compute the differences between those stocks of goodwill to show that
GD − GC = b
2θ2(3 − φ)
8βδ(δ + ρ)(2 − φ)2 > 0 ∀φ(0,1) and
GD − GN = θ
2[2a2(3 − φ)φ + b2(6 − 2φ − φ2)]
16βδ(δ + ρ)(2 − φ)2 > 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,1). 
When a RSC is complemented by a support program, the stock of goodwill always turns
out to be higher than in the other scenarios while a support program alone assures higher
levels of the state only under some particular conditions. Using a dual instrument mechanism
leads to higher wholesale price and retailer price since they are state dependent while the
other parameters no longer change.
Proposition 12 Under a RSC complemented with a support program it turns out that V DM >
V CM and V DR > V CR .
Proof Compute the difference V DM − V CM to show that
V DM − V CM =
b2θ4[2ρ(6 − 5φ + φ2) + δ(5 − 4φ + φ2)]
64β2δρ(δ + ρ)2(2 − φ)4 > 0 ∀φ(0,1).
Further, compute V DR − V CR to show that
V DR − V CR =
b2θ4(δ + 2ρ)(3 − 4φ + φ2)
64β2δρ(δ + ρ)2(2 − φ)4 > 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,1). 
Corollary 3 The previous results also hold when the players use the same advertising media
(a = b).
Notice that the result of the previous proposition also holds when φ = 0, thus a sup-
port program leads to higher players’ payoff independently of the contract scheme adopted.
Consequently, in the particular case when φ = 0, V Di|φ=0 > V Ci|φ=0 = V Ni , therefore the imple-
mentation of a support program always leads to a payoff-Pareto-improving situation when
RSC is no longer adopted. In contrast, putting in place a RSC generates some inefficiency
that a support program rarely overcomes.
Proposition 13 Under a RSC complemented by a support program it always results V DM >
V NM while it turns out that V DR > V NR only when φ ∈ (0,3 −
√
5).
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Proof Compute the difference V DM − V NM , to show that
V DM − V NM =
θ4(a2(δ + 2ρ)(4 − φ)(2 − φ)2φ)
128β2δρ(δ + ρ)2(2 − φ)4
+ b
2[ρ(24 − 12φ − 12φ2 + 8φ3 − φ4) + δ(10 − 14φ2 + 8φ3 − φ4)]
128β2δρ(δ + ρ)2(2 − φ)4
> 0 ∀φ(0,1);
further computing the difference
V DR − V NR =
θ4(4a2(δ + ρ)φ(8 − 16φ + 8φ2 − φ3) + b2(δ + 2ρ)(24 − 32φ + 8φ3 − φ4))
512β2δρ(δ + ρ)2(2 − φ)4
we can show demonstrate that:
(a) When goodwill does not depend on the manufacturer’s advertising strategy, V DR − V NR
> 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,3 − √5)
(b) When goodwill does not depend on the retailer’s advertising strategy, V DR − V NR
> 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,0.9249)
(c) When goodwill depends on both players’ advertising strategies, V DR − V NR
> 0 ∀φ ∈ (0,3 − √5) and ∀φ ∈ (3 − √5,0.9249) ⇔ b > a. 
Further, when φ = 3 − √5, V Di = V Ni . Complementing a RSC with a support program
lessens negative effect of contracting. Although complementing a RSC with a support pro-
gram lowers the retailer’s myopia, the combination of coordination mechanisms not longer
leads to a Pareto improving situation when the sharing parameter is too high. Another condi-
tion needed is that the retailer advertising effectiveness should be substantially higher than
the manufacturer’s one. This is quite convincible as the support program has the purpose
of increasing retailer advertising efforts, which turn out to decrease profits for low value of
retailer advertising effectiveness. When the retailer has enough bargaining power to set up
a proper sharing parameter value, complementing a RSC with a support program leads to a
payoff-Pareto-improving situation.
Corollary 4 Assume that ρ = δ, when the players use the same advertising media (a = b)
it results that V DM − V NM > 0, ∀φ(0,1) and V DR − V NR > 0, ∀φ(0,0.8572). Thus, the imple-
mentation of a RSC complemented with a support program makes the manufacturer always
better off, while the retailer’s economic advantages depend on the sharing parameter val-
ues. Equal players’ advertising effectiveness enlarges the sharing parameter range inside
which both players are economically better off and thus increases the chances to coordinate
a marketing channel when a RSC and a support program are simultaneously implemented.
6 Conclusions
Contrary to the literature on operations that lauds the adoption of a RSC to mitigate the dou-
ble marginalization effect and increase profits, we show that this contract scheme is payoff-
Pareto-improving only in a few cases. This is due to our atypical assumption for which the
player who transfers a part of his revenues does also advertising. Under this assumption a
RSC misaligns players’ motivations to invest in advertising and destroys economic value.
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Table 1 Summary of the findings




use the same advertising
media
The goodwill does not


































































Offering a support program represents thus a valid alternative to alleviate the drawbacks a
RSC creates, again aligning players’ motivations to focus on dynamic tools. Even though,
setting up high sharing parameter values lowers the benefits that a support program implies
and a RSC continues to lessen players’ payoffs. In our research, we purposely disregard the
case when a WPC is complemented with a support program because we get results aligned
to the literature of marketing (e.g., Jørgensen et al. 2003) as well as the case of full support
program because it leads to a centralized scenario in which the retailer transfers all her rev-
enues to the manufacturer. Finally, a support program is generally payoff-Pareto-improving
while the adoption of a RSC rarely leads to the same result. Table 1 summarizes the findings
of this research.
Future research could be developed in several directions. We could evaluate the simul-
taneous use of support programs and other contracts (e.g., flexible quantity), thereby inte-
grating coordination mechanisms generally used in marketing and operations management.
Furthermore, marketing and operational tools, such as quality, promotion, and new product
development, could be used to evaluate the effectiveness of a RSC. Other contracts (e.g. a
reverse RSC) could be evaluated for their ability to achieve coordination in marketing chan-
nels. Finally, case studies and empirical research are needed in this domain, where the use
of a two-parameter contract seems to be the focus in only a few business applications (e.g.,
the video rental industry).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the
source are credited.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 We need to establish the existence of bounded and continuously
differentiable value functions V NM (G),V NR (G) such that there exists a unique solution GN(t)
to (1) and the HJB equations. The players’ HJBs in the non-coordinated scenario are:









+ V N ′M
(











+ V N ′R
(
aANM + bANR − δGN
) (31)
Since the game is played à la Stackelberg and the manufacturer is the leader, we first deter-






ANR = bV NR (33)












+ V N ′M
(
aANM + b2V NR − δG
) (34)






ANM = aV NM (36)






While substituting (33), (35), (36) and (37) into (31) and (34), the HJBs turn out to be:



















We conjecture linear value functions, V NM = ϕN1 GN + ϕN2 ,V N ′M = ϕN ′1 , and V NR = ςN1 GN +
ςN2 ,V
N ′
R = ςN ′1 where ϕN1 , ϕN2 , ςN1 and ςN2 are the constant parameters to be identified. Sub-


















) = θ2GN + 8βςN ′1
(




where the value parameters may be easily identified as follows:
ϕN1 =
θ2
8β(ρ + δ) , (42)
ϕN2 =
ϕN1 (a
2ϕN1 + 2b2ςN1 )
2ρ
, (43)
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ςN1 =
θ2
16β(ρ + δ) , (44)
ςN2 =




Proof of Proposition 2 We need to establish the existence of bounded and continuously
differentiable value functions V CM(G),V CR (G) such that there exists a unique solution GC(t)
























aACM + bACR − δGC
) (47)
Since the coordinated scenario is also played à la Stackelberg and the manufacturer is the
leader, we first determine the necessary conditions of the retailer, as given by:
pC = βω
C + θ√GC(1 − φ)
2β(1 − φ) , (48)
ACR = bV C
′
R (49)





GC(1 − φ) − βωC
2(1 − φ)
)(









aACM + bACR − δGC
) (50)




β(2 − φ) , (51)
ACM = aV C
′
M (52)




2β(2 − φ) (53)
While substituting (49), (51), (52) and (53) into (47) and (50), the HJBs turn out to be:



















Linear value functions satisfy (54) and (55); therefore, we conjecture V CM = ϕC1 GC +ϕC2 and
V CR = ςC1 GC + ςC2 , where ϕC1 , ϕC2 , ςC1 and ςC2 are the constant parameters to be identified.
220 Ann Oper Res (2012) 196:201–222
Substituting V CM(G) and V CR (G) and their derivatives into (54) and (55), we obtain
4β(2 − φ)ρ(ϕC1 GC + ϕC2
) = θ2GC + 2β(2 − φ)ϕC1
(
a2ϕC1 + 2b2ςC1 − 2δGC
)
, (56)
4β(2 − φ)2ρ(ςC1 GC + ςC2
)
= θ2GC(1 − φ) + 2β(2 − φ)2ςC1
(
2a2ϕC1 + b2ςC1 − 2δGC
) (57)
where the value parameter may be easily identified as follows:
ϕC1 =
θ2
4β(2 − φ)(ρ + δ) , (58)
ϕC2 =
ϕC1 (a





4β(2 − φ)2(ρ + δ) , (60)
ςC2 =




Proof of Proposition 10 We need to establish the existence of bounded and continuously
differentiable value functions V DM (G),V DR (G) such that there exists a unique solution GD(t)






















GD − βpD)(pD(1 − φ) − ωD) − A
D2




aADM + bADR − δGD
) (63)
Also this scenario is played à la Stackelberg and the manufacturer is the leader, thus we
determine the retailer’s necessary conditions, who decides the retail price and advertising
efforts, as given by:
pD = θ
√
GD(1 − φ) + βωD





1 − B (65)
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GD(1 − φ) − βωD
2(1 − φ)
)(


























Thus, we compute the manufacturer’s necessary conditions given by the wholesale price,




β(2 − φ) , (67)





M − V D′R
2V D′M + V D′R
(69)




2β(2 − φ) (70)
Substitute (65), (67), (68), (69) and (70) into the HJBs and assume linear V DM = ϕD1 GD +ϕD2
and V DR = ςD1 GD +ςD2 . Following the same procedure as in the proof of Propositions 1 and 2
provides the remaining results of Proposition 10. 
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